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Introduction
[M]en and women are not only themselves; they are also the region in which
they are born, the city apartment or the farm in which they learned to walk,
the games they played as children, the old wives' tales they overheard, the
food they ate, the schools they attended, the sports they followed, the poets
f Adjunct Faculty, Boston University School of Law. Candidate for Doctor of
Philosophy in Law, Oxford University (St. Catherine's College) (1999-Present); Visiting
Researcher, Harvard Law School (2001-02); M. St. in Law, Oxford University (2000);
J.D., Boston University School of Law (1995). The author was the grateful recipient of
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this work from his doctoral supervisors,
Professors Andrew Ashworth and A. Vaughn Lowe of All Souls College at Oxford
University, and from his mentor and friend, Dr. Craig Evan Klafter, President of the
Board of Trustees of the St. Catherine's College (Oxford) Foundation. The masculine
pronoun is used herein for the sole reason that it corresponds to the gender of the
author. Gender references in original quotations are left unaltered.
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they read, and the God they believed in. It is all these things that have made
them what they are . .. .
Beginning with the aftermath of World War II and the horrors of the
Holocaust, the international community resolved, at least officially, to treat
acts of genocide as criminal under international law, rather than excusing
them as an unfortunate (but necessary) incident of state sovereignty. The
primary international vehicle for criminalizing genocide is the 1948 Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
("Genocide Convention" or "Convention"). 2
The Genocide Convention makes clear that certain enumerated acts
against national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups are criminal under inter-
national law. Numerous states 3 have ratified the Convention and domesti-
cated the crime under their own national criminal laws. But despite
widespread acceptance and support of the treaty, the Convention lay all
but dormant for much of its existence. 4 It was only in the early 1990's,
when faced with almost unspeakable acts of barbarity in eastern Europe
and in Africa, that the United Nations implemented direct international
enforcement of the Convention by including the crime in the mandates of
the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). 5
Future international enforcement will occur, at least in theory, in the
International Criminal Court, whose underlying treaty achieved the neces-
sary number of ratifications and entered into force on July 1, 2002.6 Geno-
1. W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, THE RAZOR'S EDGE 8-9 (Penguin Books ed. 1992)(1944).
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention], adopted by G.A. Res.
260(IIl)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. At least 129 to date. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, 60 n.71 (ICTY
Trial Chamber Dec. 14, 1999), available at www.un.org/icty [hereinafter Jelisic (TC)],
criticized in Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, 'Il 53-77 (ICTY Appeal ChamberJul.
5, 2001), available at www.un.org/icty [hereinafter Jelisic (AC)].
4. Even though genocide indisputably has been an international crime since 1948,
it took nearly fifty years for the first judicial decision on the crime to issue from an
international tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Ahayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial
Chamber Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org [hereinafter Akayesu (TC)],
aff'd Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A (ICTR Appeal Chamber Jun. 1, 2001), available
at http://www.ictr.org [hereinafter Akayesu (AC)]. Several domestic and military occu-
pation courts tried and convicted defendants of various forms of genocide stemming
from Nazi activities during World War II. For a discussion of these cases, see David L.
Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. J. INT'L L. 231, 251-54 (2002).
5. See Statute of the International Tribunal, Annex, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/25704,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193, adopted pursuant to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
6. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Court, 93 AM.J.
INT'l L. 22, 22 (1999); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Ratification
Status Report, August 2002, available at www.iccnow.org.
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cide is one of four crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. 7
This article analyzes the contours of the groups protected by the Geno-
cide Convention and the means by which genocidal intent is manifested
against those groups. It advocates a broad understanding of the protec-
tions set forth in the Genocide Convention, but it does not add to the
existing debate over whether the Convention should include additional
human groups for protection beyond the national, religious, ethnic and
racial categories set forth in the treaty's text.8 Nor does it join efforts to
criticize the enumerated prohibited acts set forth in the Convention as
being artificial and unduly restrictive. 9 Rather, the emphasis here is on the
periphery of the four groups already covered by the treaty and how genoci-
dal intent is effectuated against them, not upon the groups or underlying
acts that "should" be or might have been covered had the Convention's
drafters made different choices back in 1948.
This article has two primary goals. After sketching the background of
the crime of genocide and the Genocide Convention in Part II, it moves on
in Part III to a critical analysis of the proper methodology for defining the
contours of protected human groups. The analysis focuses principally
upon academic writings and upon decisions in the international criminal
tribunals that address the issue, including the most recent decision on the
issue, the ICTR Appeal Chamber's July 2002 judgment in Prosecutor v.
Bagilishenia. 10 It argues that efforts to achieve a purely objective or scien-
tific definition of protected groups have proved to be largely artificial and
even counterproductive in practice. The better approach to defining such
groups is to adopt a more subjective inquiry into the contours of the group
as understood (and acted upon) by the perpetrators of genocide.
The subjective approach advocated in Part III is necessary because the
underlying concept of a human group, protected or otherwise, is necessa-
rily abstract and is not susceptible of definition by reference solely to
objective parameters. To the extent that objective indicia of group status
exist, the composition of the group outlined by those criteria may bear no
relation whatsoever to the group as targeted for genocide, further calling
7. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 5-6. Also included are war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and provisions to take future jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once the offense is defined. Id. at arts. 7 (crimes against humanity), 8 (war crimes), and
5(2) (aggression).
8. This ground has been well-covered already. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaak, The Crime
of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259,
2260 (1997) and sources cited therein.
9. See, e.g.. Ward Churchill, Genocide: Toward a Functional Definition, in DAVID 0.
FRIEDRICHS, I STATE CRIME, 119, 132-33 (1998) (advocating reformulation of genocide
into a crime with first through fourth degrees, depending upon the intent of the perpe-
trator); COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF
CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND 235-236 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1993) (offering reformulated definition with an illustrative listing of prohibited acts as
well as expanded categories of protected groups).
10. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (ICTR Appeal Chamber Jul. 3,
2002), available at www.ictr.org [hereinafter Bagilishema].
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into question the wisdom of extensive reliance upon so-called "objective"
measures of group identity.
This being said, a purely subjective approach does not provide a satis-
factory answer, either. Taken to its logical conclusion, a purely subjective
approach could lead to group definitions that bear no relation at all to the
established pre-genocidal existence of the group in society. This discon-
nect is inconsistent with the manifest object and purpose of the Conven-
tion, which is to protect certain categories of pre-existing human groups
from physical and biological destruction. Accordingly, this article advo-
cates a hybrid approach to defining groups that accounts for the subjective
views of the perpetrator but requires some measure of baseline objective
evidence linking the perpetrator's views to the group's pre-genocidal
existence.
Following the discussion of the contours of the protected group, Part
IV analyzes how genocidal intent actually is manifested against that
defined group in terms of the genocidist's efforts to achieve the group's
destruction. The article makes the case for a broad conception of what it
means to intend to intend to destroy a group "as such" and rejects a strict
numerical construction of the crime. It advocates the parallel recognition
of a more flexible approach grounded principally in the intentions of the
genocidist. This approach is better-suited to protecting human groups and
aligns best with the actual structure of the Genocide Convention, which
sets forth an inchoate crime that penalizes certain acts committed with a
particular mental state, rather than any actual result flowing from those
acts. Part V briefly summarizes and concludes.
I. Background
A. The Origins of the Term "Genocide"
Polish law professor Raphael Lemkin, a refugee who barely escaped the
Nazi occupation of his homeland, coined the neologism "genocide" in
1944 by combining the Greek genos (race or tribe) with the Latin cide (kill-
ing). 11 Lemkin conceived of genocide as:
[A] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essen-
tial foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves .... Genocide is directed against the national group as an
entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their
11. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944). Although the term
'genocide' is modern, the acts it contemplates are not. A commonly cited example of an
early genocide dates back to the Roman sacking of Carthage in 146 B.C. See Frank
Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocidal Killings, in GENOCIDE: A
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 39, 42 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1988). Later, "[s]pecial
wholesale massacres occurred in the wars waged by Genghis Khan and by Tamerlane."
LEMKIN, supra, 80, n.3. Early twentieth century examples include Germany's 1904 mas-
sacre of tribal Heroes in South-West Africa and the slaughter of Turkish Armenians by
the "Young Turks" of the crumbling Ottoman Empire in 1915. See BARBARA HARFF, GENO-
CIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAl AND POLITICAL ISSUES 3 (1984).
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individual capacity, but as members of the national group.12
Lemkin thus characterized genocide as a multi-faceted attack on the
existence of a human group and identified eight features of the crime,
including political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, relig-
ious, and moral genocide.1 3 In his later writings, Lemkin acknowledged
that the more widely-accepted species of the crime were its physical, biolog-
ical, and cultural manifestations. 14 Physical genocide is the tangible anni-
hilation of the group by the killing and maiming of its members, whether
committed over the short or the long term. 15 Biological genocide is the
imposition of measures calculated to decrease the overall reproductive
capacity or fertility of the group. 16 Cultural genocide is the destruction of
a group's unique cultural, linguistic, and religious characteristics. 17
B. The Genocide Convention
Lemkin's academic concept of genocide crystallized into a multilateral
treaty on the subject in relatively short order. The Genocide Convention
that exists today arose out of a process that included three General Assem-
bly resolutions, three multinational drafting committees, three working
drafts, and the participation of numerous states, voting blocs, and ideologi-
cal constituencies. 1 8 The final form of the treaty was approved unani-
mously in the General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and went into effect
in January 1951.19
12. LEMKIN, supra note 11, 79 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 79-90.
14. See, e.g., Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, U.N.
Bull., Jan. 15, 1948, at 70-71.
15. LEMKIN, supra note 11, 87-89.
16. Id. at 86-87.
17. Id. at 84-85, 89. A paradigm of cultural genocide was addressed during the trial
of Nazi governor Artur Greiser before Poland's post-war Supreme National Tribunal. See
Prosecutor v. Greiser, reprinted in 13 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 70, 80-84 (1949) (detail-
ing educational, linguistic, religious, cultural, and scientific destruction in Poland).
18. See Draft [First] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide Prepared by the Secretariat, 4 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947), reprinted
in NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION-A COMMENTARY 122-30 (1960)
(Appendix 11); Draft [Second] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee, in Report of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on Genocide to the Economic and Social Council on the Meetings of the Committee
Held at Lake Success, New York (5 Apr.- 10 May 1948), 24 May 1948, 7 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 6), at 1, U.N. Doc. E/794 (Annex) (1948), reprinted in ROBINSON, supra, 131-
137 (Appendix IV); General Assembly Resolution 96(1), The Crime of Genocide, 11 Dec.
1946, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/BUR./50 (1946); General
Assembly Resolution 180(11), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 21 Nov.
1947, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., 123rd plen. mtg., at 129-30, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947);
General Assembly Resolution 260(111)(A), Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
19. See Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260(111)(A),
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); M. CHrRIr
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAl CRIMINAl LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 1224
(1997).
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The Genocide Convention makes clear that genocide, without ques-
tion, is a criminal act. Article I provides that "[t]he Contracting Parties
confirm that Genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish."2 0 It contemplates worldwide application of the prohibition
in all possible circumstances, whether the crime is committed in time of
war or peace or as part of a larger plan or policy targeting any particular
protected group. 2 '
Article II defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 2 2 racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 23
The Genocide Convention protects people and criminalizes physical
and biological genocide.24 Individuals are protected insofar as they are
group members, but the real object of protection is the group itself.
Although "[giroups consist of individuals, and therefore destructive action
must, in the last analysis, be taken against individuals[,] ... these individu-
als are important not per se but only as members of the group to which
they belong. ' 25
There is no requirement under the Convention that a genocidist
achieve his aims or that the group attacked actually suffer total or partial
destruction. Rather, the crime is complete when certain enumerated acts
are committed against group members with the requisite intent.2 6 Geno-
cide thus is defined as an inchoate offence vis a vis the protected groups.
Inchoate offenses criminalize certain acts committed with a particular
mental state, whether or not those acts actually lead to the injury contem-
20. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. I.
21. Id.
22. Several texts incorporating the Genocide Convention replace "ethnical" with
"ethnic." See Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(1) (1988) (U.S. implementing legislation
for the Genocide Convention); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind: Titles and Texts of Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Forty-Eighth
Session (1996), in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. (No. 10), at 87, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
art. 17 (1996). Others do not. See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, art. 4(2); 1CTR Statute,
supra note 5, art. 2(2); ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 6. This article uses "ethnic," credit-
ing the Draft Code's effort "to reflect modern English usage without in any way affecting
the substance of the provision." See Draft Code, supra art. 17 cmt. 9.
23. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
24. The acts referenced in Articles 11(a), (b), and (c) constitute physical genocide;
those in Articles 11(d) and (e) constitute biological genocide. See Draft Code, supra note
22, art. 17 cmt. 12.
25. ROBINSON, supra note 18, 58.
26. See 2 PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 82 (1959).
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plated (i.e., attempts). 2 7 This is in contrast to result-oriented offenses,
which require the act in question actually to achieve a specified result (i.e.,
murder). 28
We now turn to Part III and the complexities of defining the contours
of the various groups protected under the Convention.
II. Defining A Protected Group
A. The Protected Groups Listed in the Convention
The Genocide Convention sets forth four restrictive categories of protected
groups. By definition, the crime of genocide can be perpetrated only
against individuals properly classified as belonging to national, ethnic,
racial, or religious groups. 2 9 If the victim in question lacks membership in
a protected group, genocide has not occurred with respect to that victim,
even if the actor's ultimate intention is to facilitate the destruction of a pro-
tected group. Thus, attacks on moderate Hutu during the Rwandan hostili-
ties cannot constitute genocide under the Convention, 30 even though many
of those crimes were an essential part of the overall scheme to destroy Tut-
sis as a group. 3' So, too, with respect to atrocities by the Khmer Rouge,
where prohibited genocidal acts against protected ethnic, national and
religious groups proceeded hand-in-hand with parallel attacks on eco-
nomic, social, and political groups. 32
Group status is not always an easy question to answer. As the Ruta-
ganda Trial Chamber held:
[T]he concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups have been
researched extensively and ... at present, there are no generally and interna-
tionally accepted precise definitions thereof. Each of these concepts must be
assessed in the light of a particular political, social, and cultural context. 33
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the contours of protected
groups under the Convention, the baseline characteristics of racial, ethnic,
religious, and national groups are discussed in turn.3 4
27. See, e.g., Andrew J. Ashworth, Defining Criminal Offences Without Harm, in CRIMI-
NAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF J.C. SMITH 7, 8 (Peter Smith ed., 1987).
28. Id.
29. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 11.
30. See Akaycsu (TC), supra note 4, '1 710.
31. Atrocities against moderate Hutu probably constitute crimes against humanity.
See ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 3.
32. See Jason Abrams, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects: The
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEw.
ENG. L. REV. 303, 304-06 (2001).
33. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 91 56 (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6,
1999), available at www.ictr.org; See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33 (ICTY
Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001) 9l 557, available at www.un.org/icty ("A group's cultural,
religious, ethnical, or national characteristics must be identified within the socio-historic
context which it inhabits.").
34. The various categories of protected groups under the Convention were addressed
in the context of prior writing by the author on genocidal intent. See Nersessian, supra
note 4, 260-62. Certain aspects of that baseline discussion are drawn upon here.
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1. Racial Groups
Racial groups are defined primarily by the external physical appearance of
their members. The Proxmire Act categorizes them as "a set of individuals
whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or
biological descent." 3 5 The ICTR has defined them based upon "the heredi-
tary physical traits often associated with a geographical region, irrespective
of linguistic, cultural, national, or religious factors." 3 6 Both of these con-
ceptions accord with prior academic commentary. Drost, for example,
notes that the word "racial ... refer[s] mainly to external, physical features
and appearance .... 37
2. Ethnic Groups
The ICTR has specified that an "ethnical group is generally defined as a
group whose members share a common language or culture."38 This view
accords with both the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention
and prior academic writing, which indicate that the term "ethnical" incor-
porates the social, linguistic, and cultural aspects of the group at issue. 3 9 A
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission articulated the
distinction between ethnic and racial groups as follows:
The difference between the terms 'ethnic' and 'racial' is perhaps harder to
grasp. It seems that the ethnic bond is more cultural. It is based on cultural
values and is characterized by a way of life, a way of thinking and the same
way of looking at life and things. On a deeper level, the ethnic group is
based on a cosmogony.
40
3. Religious Groups
The Akayesu Trial Chamber has opined that a "religious group is one
whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of wor-
ship." 4 ' This appears to be a functional definition grounded in the objec-
tive practices of group members. In contrast, the Proxmire Act additionally
accounts for the subjective belief system of group members and defines a
religious group as one whose members have a "common religious creed,
beliefs, doctrines, practices or rituals. '42
There is room for controversy over whether a nonreligious or an atheis-
tic group qualifies for protection under the Convention. An atheistic group
35. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1093(6).
36. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, c[ 514.
37. DROST, supra note 26, 62.
38. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 1 513.
39. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 73rd mtg. at 97-98 (1948) (Mr. Petren,
Swed.); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg. at 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75
(1948) (Mr. Petren, Swed.).
40. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4./398 and Corr. 1-3, l 58
(1986), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'- L. COMM'N 53, 60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1986/
Add.1 (1986).
41. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, ' 515.
42. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1093(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
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presumably could be comprised of individuals from a variety of faiths who
have rejected their religious heritage. In this light, atheists hardly are a
homogeneous "group." Nevertheless, they appear to share common prac-
tices and a similar belief system. It seems that either conception of relig-
ious groups is sufficient to include groups of atheists, agnostics, and other
nontheistic persons targeted for genocide, based either on their internal
"beliefs" (i.e., that there is no God) or their functional "mode of worship"
(i.e., choosing not to worship at all). 4 3 This view accords with the general
trend of international thought on the issue. 44
4. National Groups
The Convention's reference to "national" groups implies a definition
grounded in nationality and citizenship. The Proxmire Act defines a
national group as one "whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of
nationality or national origins." 45 The implication of this formulation is
that any individual can belong to at least two national groups simultane-
ously: the nation of birth origin and the nation(s) of current citizenship.
The International Court of Justice dealt with the question of national-
ity in the Nottebohm Case, which involved a claim arising out of Frederic
Nottebohm's arrest and permanent expulsion from Guatemala. 46 The
issue of nationality was central to the case because Liechtenstein could
press its diplomatic claim for damages only if Nottebohm truly was its
citizen.4 7
Frederic Nottebohm was a German businessman who lived in Guate-
mala for over 30 years. When World War II broke out, Guatemala sided
with the Allies. Nottebohm applied for, and was granted, citizenship in
Liechtenstein under a special law that waived Liechtenstein's ordinary 3-
year residency requirement. But upon his return to Guatemala in 1940
under a Liechtenstein passport, Nottebohm was interred as an enemy alien
and was later deported, his property being expropriated by the govern-
ment. After the war, Liechtenstein sought redress from Guatemala in the
ICJ, alleging that Nottebohm was its citizen and claiming damages, inter
alia, for the uncompensated taking of Nottebohm's extensive assets. 48
Guatemala defended on the grounds that Nottebohm was not a genuine
national of Liechtenstein under international law.4 9
43. See id.; Ahayesu (TC), supra note 4, '1 515. See also Mathew Lippman, Genocide:
The Crime of the Century- The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the new Millennium,
23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 467, 475 (2001) ("The term 'religious' encompasses theistic, non-
theistic, and atheistic groups that are united by a single spiritual ideal.").
44. See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR, 73d plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 51, at 171, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) ("Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom
to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice.
45. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1093(6).
46. Nottebohm Case (Licht. v. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. 4, 6-7 (6 Apr.) (Second Phase).
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 7, 13-16.
49. Id. at 9.
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The ICJ held that Liechtenstein's domestic determination of Not-
tebohm's status was not dispositive and that the issue of nationality under
international law was a separate question.50 The 1CJ described nationality
as:
a legal bond having its basis [in] a social fact of attachment, a genuine con-
nection of existence, interests, and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expres-
sion of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly
by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely
connected to the population of the State conferring nationality than with
that of any other State.' 5 I
The ICJ ultimately decided that Nottebohm was not Liechtenstein's
national under international law and dismissed the case against Guate-
mala.52 Unfortunately for Frederic Nottebohm, under German law he
ceased to be a national of Germany when he applied for citizenship in
Liechtenstein. 53 And Guatemala hardly considered him its citizen: it jailed
Nottebohm as an "enemy alien," took his property, and deported him.
The Nottebohm decision can be criticized because it essentially left Fre-
deric Nottebohm stateless. Some authorities hold, however, that the case
can be restricted to its unique context, thereby limiting its stringent future
application. Under this view, the Nottebohm Case dealt solely "with the
admissibility of a claim for diplomatic protection and did not imply that a
person could be generally treated as stateless."15 4
Whatever the ultimate character of the ICJ's judgment, it is clear that
Nottebohm still bears some international effect: its dictum concerning
"dominant and effective nationality" has been adopted and applied in other
international cases dealing with the question of nationality. 55 More
recently, the ICTR imported the Nottebohm criteria and defined a national
group as "a collection of people who are perceived to share a common legal
bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and
duties."5 6 Group members' personal conceptions of their own nationality
(whether by affiliation or otherwise) thus are not dispositive of the ques-
tion. The tribunal's focus on the legal aspects of nationality (on "rights and
duties" and "a common legal bond") makes clear that a collection of indi-
viduals organized on the basis of political beliefs is insufficient to consti-
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 26.
53. See Satvinder Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and the Doctrine of Exclusive
Domestic Jurisdiction, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 236 (1994).
54. See Draft Articles on Nationality of Stateless Persons in Relation to the Succession of
States, art. 19 cmt. 3, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Ch. 4 (1999),
available at www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1999/english/chap4.htm., and sources cited
therein.
55. See e.g., Islamic Rep. of Iran v. United States of America, Case No. A/18, Decision
No. DEC 32-A18-FT, Apr. 6, 1984 ("In determining the dominant and effective national-
ity, the Tribunal will consider all relevant factors, including habitual residence, center of
interests, family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of attachment.").
56. Ahayesu (TC), supra note 4, l 512.
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tute a national "group" under the Convention without some additional
legal interest tying them together.
5 7
This being said, some commentators believe that the concept of
nationality embodied in the Convention nevertheless is broader than the
conception articulated in Akayesu. Lyal Sunga argues that
'National Group' in Article II appears to refer to a distinct people who forms
a 'nation' or 'people' in the sense that the members of such a group share
linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural similarities (or some of these) which
distinguish it from the general population, rather than to any legal criteria
concerning citizenship or nationality.
58
5. Overlapping Groups
The enumerated categories of protected groups are not inherently distinct,
leading to protection for some groups on multiple bases. Persons of Jewish
descent, for example, are protected both as an ethnic and a religious group,
and probably as a national group as well. 59 Tribal groups fall under the
Convention 60 and may satisfy the criteria for any or all of the four
categories.
As the ICTY recently stated:
National, ethnical, racial or religious groups are not clearly defined in the
Convention or elsewhere. In contrast, the preparatory work on the Conven-
tion and the work conducted by international bodies in relation to the pro-
tection of minorities show that the concepts of protected groups and
national minorities partially overlap and are on occasion synonymous ....
The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list
was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly correspond-
ing to what was recognized, before the second world war, as 'national minor-
ities,' rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups.61
Apart from distinguishing between the protected groups themselves,
there is also potential for overlap between protected and unprotected
groups. Political groups, for example, were deliberately excluded from the
final version of the Convention.6 2 Nevertheless, there has been some
thought that the concept of national groups includes political groups.
Thus, Drost argues that "political groups which are at the same time
national groups are protected under the Convention.163
57. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg. at 113, 115, U.N. Doc. A/
C.6/SR.75 (1948) (Mr. Lacks, Pol.) (Mr. Petren, Swed.).
58. LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 111, n. 11
(1997).
59. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 53 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusalem
1961), aff'd Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (lsr. Sup. Ct. 1962)
(referencing "the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to
every Jew, and confer upon the Jewish People the status of a fully privileged member of
the comity of nations.").
60. See Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt. 9.
61. Krstic, supra note 33, 1H 555-56.
62. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 128th mtg. at 663-64, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.128 (1948).
63. DROST, supra note 26, 62.
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Drost's point is technically accurate but should not be taken as
extending the Genocide Convention to cover political groups. Political
affiliations, as noted above, are insufficient to establish nationality in and
of themselves. In truth, the tag-along political (or social or economic) char-
acter of a protected group is irrelevant. The only proper inquiry under the
Convention is whether the group qualifies as a protected group, not
whether it also has additional characteristics that fall outside the
Convention.
6. Non-Enumerated Groups
A strict positivist reading of the Convention denies protection to all human
collectives except national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. 6 4 Never-
theless, the ICTR deviated from a strict textual analysis to answer the ques-
tion of whether Rwandan Tutsi constituted a protected group under the
Genocide Convention.
In Akayesu, the ICTR looked past the plain text of the Genocide Con-
vention (and its own articulation of the characteristics of an ethnic group)
and analyzed the Convention's drafting history. The Court held that it was
"particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Geno-
cide Convention, which according to the travaux preparatoires, was
patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group."
65 It
then determined that "a common criterion in the four types of groups pro-
tected by the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups
would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong
to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable man-
ner."6 6 Applying this analysis, the tribunal found that Tutsi constituted a
distinct and stable ethnic group even though they shared language, society,
and culture with the Hutu that massacred them.
67
The Akayesu decision is not terribly precise in its articulation of crite-
ria to evaluate the existence of additional "permanent and stable" groups. 68
64. See, e.g., Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former
Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 821-22 (1997) (no protection for gender-based groups under the
Genocide Convention).
65. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 516 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at l 511.
67. Id. at I 122, 124, 702, and n.56. For the contrary view, see Tara Sapru, Into the
Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Into the Rwandan
Crisis, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329, 343-44 (1997) (arguing that Tutsi do not qualify as a dis-
tinct ethnic, national, religious or racial group).
68. This is an overarching issue with opinions from the ICTR and the ICTY. As
hybrids of the inquisitorial civil and adversarial common law systems, the tribunals
must both opine the law and make detailed factual findings while ensuring that the
accused benefits from the presumption of innocence and that the prosecution estab-
lishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This leads to written opinions of considerable
length where the articulation of legal rules and factual findings is not always distinct.
See Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions
53/212 and 53/213, Nov. 22, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/634, ' 61 (citing as examples the
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The ruling clearly indicates that the determination should be made on a
case-by-case basis in light of the social, political, and cultural characteris-
tics from which the group derives.6 9 This being said, it is unclear whether
the ICTR merely applied new criteria to interpret the scope of one of the
four existing protected groups or moved beyond the text of the Convention
to announce a new rule granting protection to additional "stable and per-
manent" groups beyond those listed in the Convention.
The opinion can be read both ways. On one hand, the ICTR's decision
in Akayesu could be limited to the facts of the case before it and to the
specific context of ethnic groups. Its holding could be confined factually
to Article 2 of the ICTR Statute, to the specific facts of the situation in
Rwanda in 1994, and to the particular ethnic group comprising Tutsis. In
this light, the Tribunal simply engaged in a broader analysis (moving
beyond the generally-accepted criteria of distinctiveness of language, soci-
ety, and culture) to determine whether Tutsis were distinctly "ethnic" for
purposes of the Convention.
Conversely, a broader conception of protected groups under the Geno-
cide Convention itself can be derived from the case. Dictum from the Tri-
bunal speaks to a wider doctrinal approach whose aim is to determine
whether the "common criterion" of stability and permanence exists with
respect to a particular (albeit non-enumerated) group. 70 This approach
derives from the "manifest intent" of the drafters of the Genocide Conven-
tion. In this light, the reach of the Convention itself (and not just the ICTR
Statute) extends beyond its plain text to any stable and permanent group.
One commentator argues that the ICTR formulation indeed stretches
beyond Akayesu and allows the protection of any so-called "institutional"
group under the Convention. 7 1 On the whole, however, this expansive
reading of Akayesu is properly subject to significant criticism. Despite
understandable motives, the tribunal's legal basis for moving beyond the
four enumerated categories set forth in Article 2 of the ICTR Statute is
questionable.
First, the tribunal's decision represents a substantial departure from
long-standing principles of treaty construction under international law.
The stated rationale behind the holding was the so-called "manifest intent"
of the Convention's drafters. 72 But the travaux preparatoires of the Geno-
cide Convention (or any treaty, for that matter) are by no means dispositive
and must be considered in their proper context. Widely-accepted interna-
450 page opinion in Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T (ICTY Trial Chamber
Nov. 16, 1998), the 294 page Akayesu opinion, and the 256 page opinion in Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (ICTR Trial Chamber May 21, 1999)); '1 82 (discuss-
ing hybrid system).
69. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 'H[l 122, 702, and n.56.
70. See id. at 511.
71. See Johan D. Van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
23 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 305 (1999). With little further analysis, the commentator
then concludes that the Akayesu formulation affords international protection to homo-
sexuals as a group. Id. at 305-06.
72. See Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, cl 516.
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tional authority provides that the travaux should not even be used as an
interpretive tool in the first instance, limiting their utility either to rectify-
ing a manifestly absurd or conflicting treaty construction or confirming a
plain-text interpretation. 73 But even such supplemental use of the travaux
was unwarranted in Akayesu. The clear text of the Convention sets forth
four protected groups, and four protected groups only. The plain meaning
of that articulation is that only those four groups are covered. 74
Second, any reliance upon original drafting records, whether or not
otherwise appropriate, itself is subject to a certain degree of criticism on
the grounds of being overly-selective in referencing source material to sup-
port a particular point. The Genocide Convention was a work of compro-
mise and negotiation between some fifty-seven states, 75 with a variety of
close votes on a number of key provisions. 76 As the Drafting Committee
Chairman pointed out, statements by various states as to the meaning of a
particular provision were not meant to have any binding effect: they merely
indicated that a majority of the drafting committee ascribed a certain inter-
pretation to a particular text. 77 And with respect to proposed amendments
that were later adopted, the Sixth Committee expressly "did not necessarily
adopt the interpretation given by [the proposal's] author." 78
Last, the tribunal's perceived analytical distinction between stable and
unstable, alienable and inalienable groups simply is intellectually unsatis-
fying. Nationality and religion are freely alienable, for example, and have
been for some time. 79 Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the UN General Assembly on the heels of the Genocide Con-
vention, expressly acknowledges the right to alter nationality and relig-
ion.8 0 Ethnicity can be cast off by adopting the cultural and linguistic
characteristics of another group. Racial characteristics, perhaps the most
immutable of all, increasingly can be altered through surgical and techno-
73. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires a treaty to be
interpreted in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of its text in light of its object
and purpose. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(l). Supplementary recourse to the travaux is permitted in
only two circumstances, either: (1) to confirm a plain-meaning analysis of the text under
Article 31; or (2) to ascertain the meaning of the treaty if the Article 31 interpretation
renders it ambiguous or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. Id. at art.
32.
74. This is not meant to preclude the possibility of a wider conception of the crime
under customary international law. Rather, as a matter of treaty interpretation, the
Akayesu tribunal's analysis of the travaux was misapplied.
75. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., xiv-xix.
76. See generally Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1 (1985).
77. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 132nd mtg. at 700, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.132 (1948) (Chairman).
78. Id., 77th mtg. at 136-37 (1948) (Mr. Maktos, U.S.).
79. This was recognized even during the drafting of the Convention. Id., 69th mtg.
at 60 (1948) (Mr. Shawcross, U.K.).
80. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/
810, arts. 15, 18 (1948).
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logical advances.8 With this in mind, the assumption that some group
characteristics are manifestly alienable and that others are not becomes
more and more questionable.
The further implications of the Akayesu decision are far-ranging and
lie beyond the scope of this work. The remaining analysis in this article
considers the decision only in its more restrictive setting (i.e., as setting
forth additional criteria to ascertain the scope of a particular ethnic group).
B. How is Group Membership Determined?
It is the province of a court trying a genocide case to determine whether
particular victims qualify for membership in protected racial, national, eth-
nic and religious groups under the Convention.8 2 But what criteria should
the Court apply to make this decision?
One possibility includes an objective determination of group status. In
the objective inquiry, neither the victim's nor the perpetrator's views are
dispositive, though they are taken into account as evidence. The objective
determination is also informed by, for example, expert testimony from
anthropologists, historians, and religious scholars, evidence from knowl-
edgeable "outsiders" (i.e., former colonial rulers), testimony from legal
scholars on the citizenship law of a particular nationality, and other simi-
lar sources.
The other chief alternative is to seek a subjective inquiry into the crite-
ria used by the perpetrator to define the group targeted for genocide
(meaning that the perpetrator's view, once established, is dispositive as to
whether that victim was a member of a given protected group). 8 3
Both the subjective and objective theories have been drawn on, in vary-
ing forms, by the ICTR and the ICTY in recent genocide cases. The case
law reflects some theoretical confusion in the tribunals that has yet to be
resolved once and for all at the appellate level, although the July 2002 ICTR
Appeals Chamber decision in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema 8 4 certainly reflects
some progression of the legal thought in this area.
81. See, e.g., JOHN H. GRInFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1962) (narrative by a white reporter
who altered his skin color with pigment medication in order to experience first-hand the
racial segregation laws governing southern blacks in the United States during the late
1950s).
82. This is not to suggest that states do not (or should not) make this determination
themselves for other (i.e., political) purposes. The United States Department of State, for
example, readily concluded in early 1994 that Tutsi constituted an ethnic group and that
genocide probably was being committed in Rwanda against them. See Sean Murphy,
Department of State Legal Analysis of 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 96 AM. J. INT'i L. 258,
259-60 (2002).
83. In the Musema case, the ICTR also ruled that the existence of a protected group
can also be the subject of a defence admission, obviating the need for proof on the issue
under either test. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13, '1 935 (1CTR Trial
Chamber Jan. 27, 2000), aff'd Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13 (ICTR
Appeals Chamber Nov. 16, 2001), available at www.ictr.org.
84. See Bagilishema, supra note 10, 11f 60-65.
Cornell International Law Journal
1. The Objective Approach
The Commission of Experts that investigated the Rwandan crisis and rec-
ommended establishing the ICTR believed that it was "not necessary to
presume or posit the existence of a race or ethnicity itself as a scientifically
objective fact."s Nevertheless, the ICTR decision in Akayesu was largely
grounded in a search for tangible indicia of group membership and an
objective judicial determination of group status. Evidence credited by the
tribunal included testimony about national identity cards (a holdover from
former Belgian colonizers) that identified their holders as Hutu or Tutsi.8 6
The Court found that Tutsi witnesses testified credibly as to their separate
ethnic identity8 7 and determined that the former Belgian colonizers in
Rwanda likewise distinguished between Hutu and Tutsi.88 Based on "the
facts brought to its attention during the trial,"8' 9 the ICTR ruled that "Tutsi
did indeed constitute a stable and permanent group and were identified as
such by all." 90
At least one other court applied an objectified approach to defining
protected groups under the Genocide Convention. In Kayishema, the ICTR
credited the Akayesu decision on Tutsi ethnicity but took independent evi-
dence and made its own finding on the point.9 1 In addition to similar
evidence of identity cards and subjective testimony on group composition,
the Kayishema court also credited expert testimony on the status of Tutsi
as an ethnic group.9 2
Some commentators have labeled Kayishema a purely subjective deci-
sion, 9 3 and it is true that the tribunal at least acknowledged that a subjec-
tive approach might also be possible, in terms either of the ethnic group's
self-identification or the composition imposed upon the group by the per-
petrators. 94 Nevertheless, it is clear that in application the tribunal focused
its efforts on determining the group status of Tutsi as a stand-alone con-
cept, rather than linking the legal standard exclusively either to the minds
of the Tutsi victims or to Kayishema himself as a perpetrator of genocide. 9 5
85. Final Report on the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 cl 159 (1994) [hereinafter S.C.
1994 Expert Report].
86. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 31 702. Despite some apparent distinguishing fea-
tures, it often proved difficult to separate Hutu and Tutsi based upon physical appear-
ance. See, e.g., SUNGA, supra note 58, 112 ("Given the high rate of intermarriage in
Rwanda and a common language, religion and geographic area of habitation over several
centuries, it is unlikely that the Hutus and Tutsis can be distinguished from each other
on an exclusively anthropological basis, despite distinct origins and histories.").
87. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, n.56.
88. Id. at q 122.
89. Id. at cl 702.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See Kayishema, supra note 68, cl 526.
92. Id. at 1l 523-25.
93. See William A. Shabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting
Interpretations from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 375, 383 (2000).
94. See Kayishema, supra note 68, q 98.
95. Id. at cl] 522-26.
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2. The Subjective Approach
In Jelisic, the ICTY rejected the objective approach to determining group
status 9 6 and held that
[a]lthough the objective determination of a religious group still remains pos-
sible, to attempt to define a national, ethnical or religious group today using
objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exer-
cise whose result would not necessarily correspond to the perception of the
persons concerned by such categorization. Therefore, it is more appropriate
to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or religious group from the view
of those persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the
community.
9 7
The subjective approach was adopted by the ICTR in the Rutaganda 98
and Musema99 cases. But in each of these three decisions, the subjective
inquiry of the Court was tempered by a perceived limitation in the Conven-
tion restricting it to "stable" and "permanent" human groups to which indi-
viduals belonged regardless of their own desires. 10 0 Thus, the subjective
stigmatization of an otherwise excluded (i.e., political or social) target
group still does not qualify the excluded group for protection under the
Convention.
The court conducts the subjective inquiry "on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account both the relevant evidence proffered and the political
and cultural context ...."101 The subjective analysis applies to any of the
four protected groups under the Convention.' 0 2
The subjective theory recognizes that perpetrators of genocide can
stigmatize (and thus define) the victim group in one of two ways: positively
or negatively. Positive stigmatization is distinguishing the target group
based on the perpetrator's assessment of the group's characteristics (i.e.,
dark skin, attending Synagogue, social and cultural traits, etc.). 10 3 Nega-
tive stigmatization essentially is a "not me" formulation: the perpetrator
defines the characteristics of his own national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group and rejects others that lack those characteristics. 1 0 4 The rejected
individuals form a distinct (and protected) group by virtue of their
exclusion. 105
96. The judgment accounted for both the Akayesu and Kayishenia opinions. See
Jelisic, supra note 3, c 61.
97. Id. at 1 70 (emphasis added). It is unclear why theJelisic tribunal claimed that a
religious group could be defined objectively, whereas national, racial and ethnic groups
could not. As noted above, religious characteristics seem no less and no more immuta-
ble than those of nationality, ethnicity or race.
98. Rutaganda, supra note 33, c[ 55.
99. Musema, supra note 83, c 161.
100. See Jelisic, supra note 3, 1 69; Rutaganda, supra note 33 , 1 56, Musema, supra
note 83, 162.
101. Rutaganda, supra note 33, 1 58.
102. SeeJelisic, supra note 3, '1I 69-72.
103. Id. at '1 71.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Negative stigmatization has implications far beyond its application in
the tribunals. In the view of one author, negative stigmatization could be
used to "[make] the case that genocide could be committed by perpetrators
of the same ethnicity who justified their murders by an ideology which
reclassified and labeled the victims, discriminating their collaborators and
those to be saved as a new kind of people."' 0 6
Taken to its logical extreme, negative stigmatization could be used to
authorize the application of the Genocide Convention to situations like the
so-called "auto-genocide" in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge destroyed
a significant part of the Khmer people. 10 7 The Convention does not
require perpetrators to belong to a different group than the victims, 10 8
though a case of genocide where the victim and perpetrator belonged to the
same group undoubtedly would be rare.
Though possible in theory, the actual stigmatization in cases of auto-
genocide is in all probability grounded in something besides nationality,
ethnicity, religion or race. If Khmers are killing Khmers, the targeting is
probably (with the possible exceptions of mass murder/suicide, as perhaps
with large scale cult activity, or a group member's collaboration with
genocidists to ensure individual self-preservation) grounded in criteria
other than protected group status (i.e., in political beliefs, social groups,
economic status, etc.). Negatively stigmatized or not, groups so-targeted
based upon such other criteria do not qualify for protection under the
Convention.
3. Evaluating the Subjective & Objective Approaches
Both the subjective and objective inquiries contemplate a case-by-case
determination based upon the group victimized.' 0 9 The primary distinc-
tion between them is the degree of reliance placed upon the perpetrator's
definition of the protected group. The perpetrator's definition of the group
is dispositive as to the contours of the group under the subjective approach,
whereas it is only one of several factors in the objective formulation.
Viewed in isolation, neither approach is entirely satisfactory. First, as
the Jelisic court noted, the "perilous exercise" of defining groups "using
objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria" does not necessarily
lead to sensible results corresponding "to the perceptions of the persons
concerned by such categorization."' 10 Unless the genocidists specifically
consulted anthropologists or historians to develop criteria, the "scientific"
determination of what constitutes a particular group may bear no resem-
blance whatsoever to the group actually targeted. Scientific and historic
106. HELEN FEIN, GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1993).
107. Id.
108. Benjamin Whitaker, Special Rapporteur, Revised and Updated Report on the Ques-
tion of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1 31, Jul. 2, 1985, 38 UN
ESCOR, Human Rights Sub-Comm'n on the Prevent. of Discrim. and Protect. of Minori-
ties, 38th Sess., at 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985).
109. Id.; Ahayesu (TC), supra note 4, cH 122, 702, n.56.
110. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, 70.
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evidence itself is to some extent subjective, being subject to competing
expert testimony and clashes of scholarly opinion. The opinions and
beliefs of former colonizers and knowledgeable "outsiders" likewise are
susceptible to the identical criticisms of being both irrelevant (except to the
extent that the beliefs were adopted by the genocidists) and subject to
clashes of opinion.
Testimony by group members on their personal understanding of
group membership is problematic because, in cases of genocide, it really is
how the perpetrator defines the group that counts. In Nazi Germany, for
instance, what mattered was how the Nazi government categorized some-
one as a Jew, not whether the victim attended Synagogue, participated in
the Jewish community, spoke Hebrew, etc.'I 1 Serbs, Muslims, and
Rwandans determine the religion and ethnicity of a child solely based
upon the religion and ethnicity of the father.' l 2 Jews do not. 11 3 Thus,
whether an individual sees himself as a member of a particular group is
largely irrelevant to whether or not he ultimately is targeted for genocide as
part of a perpetrator's efforts to destroy the group.
Evidence of the subjective views of the victims also suffers from the
practical drawback of being susceptible to loss during the genocide itself.
If the genocide is particularly successful, there may be few or no survivors
left to testify about the group identity. Any remaining survivors justifiably
may fear further retaliation if they testify, whatever protective measures are
offered to keep their identities secret.' 14 If cultural genocide accompanies
physical and biological genocide (and it often does),'' 5 the documentary
and historical records of the group's self-definition likewise may be
destroyed.
Since it really is the genocidist who defines the target group, the better
method is to bring the primary focus to the perpetrator's subjective stigma-
tization of the group. Genocide is a crime that we punish, not based upon
the underlying acts themselves (murder, assault, etc.), but based upon the
special intent with which those acts were accomplished. The genocidist's
mental state toward the group is the critical element: it distinguishes geno-
.111. The application of the Nuremberg Laws led to a complex formula to determine
whether a person was a "full Jew." Ultimately, the question turned on whether one had
three or more Jewish grandparents. Lesser categories of Jews included Mischlinge of the
first (two Jewish grandparents) and second (one Jewish grandparent) degrees. See Reich
Citizenship Law: First Regulation, arts. 2, 5 (Germany 14 Nov. 1935), available at www.
us-israel.org/jsource.Holocaust.html (visited May 2, 2000). See also LEMKIN, supra note
11, 75-78.
112. See Kayishenia, supra note 68, cj 523 (customary practice of Rwandans); Siobhan
K. Fisher, Note, Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DuKe L. J.
91, 114 (1996) (customary practices of Serbs and Muslims).
113. See Fisher, supra note 112, 114.
114. Both tribunals, for example, offer varying degrees of protection to victims and
witnesses. See ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 21; ICTY Statute, supra note 5, art. 22.
115. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Confirmation of Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61, '1q 94-95, Case Nos. ICTY-95-5-R61 and ICTY-95-18-R61 (ICTY Trial Chamber
Jul. 11, 1996).
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cide from murder. It criminalizes acts against protected groups qua
groups.
It is not too far afield to suggest that the contours of protected groups
should be determined, at least in part, by the subjective beliefs of those
who seek to destroy them. The fundamental nature of the crime derives
from the perpetrator's desire to destroy the group, which necessarily is an
abstracted concept that can refer only to collectives of individuals, none of
whom are protected as individuals under the Genocide Convention. With-
out a subjective definition, the aims of the Convention are thwarted
because the conduct and intentions of the perpetrator, which we seek to
punish, may bear no relation to an "objective" measure of the group
attacked.
The perpetrator's views on group status may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances in which the genocide took place and from any pattern of con-
duct directed against the target group.'' 6 This is not to suggest, however,
that the perpetrator's definition of the group should be viewed in a vacuum
or taken as being entirely dispositive of the question. Taken to its logical
extreme, the subjective test risks severing a fundamental link between the
perpetrator's definition of the group and the contours of the group as it
existed in society before the genocide.
A simple example makes the point. Consider, for example, a
genocidist who confesses to committing prohibited acts with the intent to
destroy all Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. This particular genocidist defines the
ethnic group of Tutsi as anyone holding a national identity card identifying
them as Tutsi, along with their "associates" and "supporters." This defini-
tion of 'Tutsi' is broad enough to include so-called moderate Hutu, who
were massacred in parallel attacks during the 1994 genocide. But can this
perpetrator's individual conception of the group of Tutsi stand in this cir-
cumstance, such that we can properly characterize his attack on moderate
Hutu as an act of genocide?
The answer is no. There is a patent conflict in this hypothetical
between the perpetrator's subjective definition of the group and even the
most remote understanding of Tutsi ethnicity as it existed in pre-1994
Rwanda. The fundamental disconnect created by the absence of any kind
of tangible indicia of group membership supporting the perpetrator's
understanding is fatal to adopting a purely subjective approach. This is
particularly true in the context of one of the world's most serious crimes.
At a minimum, then, there must be some colorable evidence that the
victim group has some recognized racial, national, ethnic or religious exis-
tence outside of the mind of the perpetrator. This is necessary to ensure
that the perpetrator's conception of the victim group bears some logical
relation to one or more of the four categories set forth in the Genocide
Convention. Absent this requirement, a virtually unlimited number of pro-
tected groups would exist, depending solely upon the creativity of the per-
petrator in defining criteria for membership in a particular protected
116. See Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 'I 523.
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group. A purely subjective test thus conflicts with the object and purpose
of the Convention itself, where a number of compromises and hard choices
were made during the drafting process in an effort to achieve consensus
upon a restricted number of enumerated groups for protection.
Colorable evidence could include any of the so-called "objective" fea-
tures of group membership drawn upon by the Akayesu and Kayishema
tribunals.' 17 The difference is in how that evidence is used. Under the
objective approach, it was to determine the parameters of the group
itself. 1 8 Under the analysis advocated here, the evidence serves merely as
a backstop to ensure some logical connection between the perpetrator's
definition of the group and the group's pre-genocidal existence.
Once this minimum baseline is demonstrated, however, the remainder
of the inquiry should focus solely upon the group as defined by the perpe-
trator. After all:
It would not be logically necessary to postulate the existence of objective and
clear-cut distinctions among groups of people to prove that a particular
group was stigmatized and targeted. In this sense, the perception of differ-
ences is more important than the differences themselves .... ITihe Genocide
Convention can be implemented effectively only if courts recognize that the
prosecution should not be expected to prove the unprovable. What matters
is the targeting of the group in question, the intention to destroy the group in
whole or in part and actual measures to carry this intention out."119
Any drawbacks associated with a primarily subjective approach to
determining group status (tempered by a baseline of objective indicia) are
outweighed by the practical impossibility of defining groups in any other
way. The Akayesu tribunal, for example, resorted to dramatic lengths of
semantic sleight of hand to justify departing from the Convention's plain
wording of "national, ethnical, racial or religious" groups.120 As shown
above, such efforts to define a protected group objectively have proved
largely artificial, suffer from serious analytical flaws and practical draw-
backs, and in any event may bear no relation at all to the group as ulti-
mately targeted.
The international criminal tribunals are on the right track with the
recent ICTR decision in Bagilishemal2 ' and the ICTY's 2001 conviction of
General Rasislav Krstic. 12 2 Both courts adopted a mixed approach to
ascertaining the existence of a protected group under the Convention. As
the Bagilishema court put it:
The Chamber notes that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and relig-
ious groups enjoy no generally or internationally accepted definition. Each
of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a particular political,
social, historical, and cultural context. Although membership of the targeted
117. See Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 702; Kayishema, supra note 68, 1523-26.
118. Id.
119. SUNGA, supra note 58, 112.
120. See discussion supra, nn. 64-81, and accompanying text.
121. See Bagilishema, supra note 10.
122. See Krstic, supra note 33.
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group must be an objective feature of the society in question, there is also a
subjective dimension. A group may not have precisely defined boundaries
and there may be occasions when it is difficult to give a definitive answer as
to whether or not a victim was a member of a protected group. Moreover, the
perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that do
not fully correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by
other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the opinion
that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging
to a protected group, the victim could be considered by the Chamber as a
member of the protected group, for the purposes of genocide.' 23
Once the contours of the protected grouped are defined, the next area
of inquiry is how, for purposes of genocide, a perpetrator's genocidal
intent is manifested against that group "as such." These issues are dis-
cussed in Part IV.
III. Genocidal Intent: What it Means to Intend to Destroy a Protected
Group "As such"
A. The Mens Rea of Genocide
The special intent that characterizes genocide is often seen as the primary
distinguishing characteristic of the crime.' 24 The Convention requires the
mens rea to extend to all or part of a protected group, as opposed to being
directed at an individual or an institution of some kind. Since "intent is a
mental factor which is difficult, even impossible to determine ... in the
absence of a confession from the accused his intent can be inferred
"125
Absent a confession or tangible documentation of genocidal plans or
acts, this inference is drawn on a case-by-case basis from evidence
presented at trial. 1 26 Essentially, the court seeks to infer what the
genocidist must have intended by taking evidence of what he actually did.
The inquiry is all-encompassing but can consist of an examination of the
number of victims,' 2 7 the methodology and pattern of the genocidal con-
duct, and the prior statements and acts of the defendant.' 28 The "general
political doctrine that gave rise to the acts" is relevant, as is the "repetition
of destructive and discriminatory acts."' 12 9 Considerations relating to a
pattern of conduct include the scale and general nature of the atrocities
committed, 1 30 the discriminatory targeting of the members or property of
123. See Bagilishema, supra note 10, 9 65. See also Krstic, supra note 33, 9 557 ("[Tlhe
Chamber identifies the relevant group by using as a criterion the stigmatization of the
group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived national,
ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.").
124. See Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, 91 498.
125. Id. at cl 523.
126. See Musema, supra note 83, 91 167; Rutaganda, supra note 33, '1 62.
127. See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention-
Part I: Substantive Scope of the Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L LJ. 686, 693 (1975).
128. SeeJelisic (TC), supra note 3, 91 73; Kayishema, supra note 68, 99[c 531-39.
129. Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 115, 91 294.
130. See Kayishema, supra note 68, 1 94.
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one group to the exclusion of other groups,'31 methodical or systematic
planning or killing, 13 2 and the weapons employed and the extent of bodily
injury. 1 33
Acts of cultural genocide, though not covered by the Convention, also
can demonstrate a specific intent to destroy a protected group. 13 4 The
ICTY described such conduct as acts that either violate or are perceived by
the perpetrator to violate the "very foundation of the group."' 35 The Trial
Chamber cited Serbian destruction of Muslim libraries and religious insti-
tutions as evidence of genocidal intent toward Muslims.1
3 6
The underlying motivations for the crime of genocide are irrele-
vant. 137 If the requisite intent exists, it matters not whether that intent was
fueled by animus toward the protected group, by hopes of financial gain, by
a personal grudge against individual group members, by ideological or
resistance, or indeed by any reason at all.1 38 Motive can, however, serve as
evidence toward proving the existence of genocidal intent.'
39
B. Discriminatory Targeting of Group Members
Genocidal acts manifest against members of the protected group, not in
their individual capacities, but based upon their membership in the
group.' 40 The individual is targeted as a means to an end: as a step further
along the path of achieving the "ultimate criminal objective" of destroying
the group.' 4 ' "Chosen as such ... the victim of the crime of genocide is
the group itself and not only the individual."' 14 2 The act extends beyond
the individual for "the realization of an ulterior motive, which is to destroy
... the group of which the individual is just one element."' 14 3
The Convention says nothing explicit about the discriminatory selec-
tion or targeting of group members. It requires simply that prohibited acts
take place against members of the protected group with the requisite level
of intent.144 The Draft Code, on the other hand, specifies that a "prohib-
ited act must be committed against an individual because of his member-
ship in a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall
131. id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
t34. See, e.g., Krstic, supra note 33, '1 480; Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 115. cT
94-95.
135. Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 115, cl 94.
136. Id. at 1 95.
137. Note, however, that it is not always clear whether specific evidence relates to
motive or intent at trial. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias
Crime Law, 16 NAT'i BLACK L.J. 144, 156-57 (1999) (noting that motive and intent are
not always analytically distinct).
138. See, e.g., Jelisic (AC), supra note 3, ci 49; DROST, supra note 26, 83-84.
139. See Kayishema, supra note 68, 1[ 93; Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 115, 'I
94-95.
140. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, c 66; Kayishema, supra note 68, c 97.
141. Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt. 6.
142. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, ci 521.
143. Id. at 11 522.
144. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 11.
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objective of destroying the protected group."' 14 5 Both the ICTR and the
ICTY adopted the Draft Code formulation and presume that some evi-
dence of discriminatory targeting of group members is necessary to estab-
lish the genocidal intent against the group. [46
The tribunals appear to use targeting as a proxy for establishing geno-
cidal intent, to help the court parce out whether an attack on a particular
group member is really directed at the larger group, rather than at that
member as an individual. The targeting requirement ensures that victims
are selected because of their group membership, rather than for personal
(i.e., revenge), financial (i.e., murder for hire), or other reasons indepen-
dent of the intent to destroy the group as such.
Certain presumptions about the actor's intent do come into play, how-
ever, in the context of the victimization. The Jelisic Trial Chamber held
that "an individual knowingly acting against the backdrop of widespread
and systematic violence being committed against only one specific group
could not reasonably deny that he chose his victims discriminatorily."1 4 7
There is no requirement that the genocidist contemplate destruction of
national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups as protected groups or that he
bear in mind any particular understanding of the nature of the group
targeted. If a prohibited act is committed against a group member with the
intent vis a vis the group, and the group qualifies as protected under the
Convention, that act constitutes genocide. A perpetrator who attacks Jews,
for example, need not conceive of the group of Jewish People as constitut-
ing a racial group, a religious group, an ethnical group, etc. It is enough
that he acted against individual Jews with the criminal intent to destroy the
larger group.
The precise contours of the targeting requirement, and the precise
degree of specificity with which a particular victim must be selected,
remain unclear. Nothing in the Draft Code or in the tribunal decisions
provides, however, that the targeting of specific or identified individuals is
required. Nor should it be. Genocide is defined in the inchoate mode and
penalizes certain acts committed with a particular mental state, not the
ultimate result of those acts. Genocidal intent does not (and should not)
depend upon the fortuity of the perpetrator having good information for
targeting purposes. So long as an attack was intended to destroy a pro-
tected group and a prohibited act was committed against group members, it
suffices as genocide under the Convention. There is no requirement that
the perpetrator have specific knowledge of the identity and characteristics
of these victims.
Consider the hypothetical example of a mass murder of a busload of
moderate Hutu and ethnic Tutsis at a roadblock in Rwanda in early 1994.
Out of 80 victims, half were Tutsi and half Hutu. If the entire busload was
slaughtered en masse, there can be little question that a prohibited act (kill-
145. Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
146. Akayesu (TC), supra note 4, '1 521, Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, ' 67; Draft Code,
supra note 22, art. 1.7 cmt. 6.
147. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, 1 73.
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ing) took place against members of a protected group (ethnic Tutsi) with
genocidal intent (inferred from evidence at trial and the wider context of
killings and persecution that left 800,000 Tutsi dead). There can be little
doubt that the killing of the Tutsi bus riders was an act of genocide. There
is no need to establish that the perpetrator of the killings had specific
knowledge that each of the 40 individual Tutsis was, in fact, a Tutsi at the
moment that he killed them. A prohibited act occurred against group
members with the requisite intent, and that is sufficient under the
Convention. 1
48
C. Destroying Group "As Such"
The intent to destroy a group "as such" means the intent to destroy the
group "as a separate and distinct entity."'1 49 As one commentator put it:
"[a]n act of genocide constitutes not just an attack on an individual, but
also a threat to the group with which the individual is identified. It is an
offense against a core aspect of humanity-the very nature of collective
human identities."]' 50
The emerging case law from the tribunals recognizes two ways in
which a group can be destroyed. The first method is the destruction of the
group in terms of sheer group size and homogeneous numerical composi-
tion (the "quantitative approach"). 15  The second contemplates the
destruction of a key segment of the group, such as its leadership or other
segments of the group deemed essential to its existence (the "qualitative
approach"). 152 During the Balkan crisis, for example, "a substratum of the
Bosnian Muslim population consisting of public officials, the well edu-
cated, and other leaders were targeted for annihilation." 1 53
1. The Quantitative Approach
The quantitative approach presumes that the victimization of either a sub-
stantial part of the group 15 4 or a substantial number of its membersi 55
leads to the destruction of the group "as such." Group members are treated
as fungible for purposes of the quantitative approach: the focus is on sheer
numbers or percentages.
148. This consideration is probably what the UN Commission of Experts had in
mind when it opined that it would be an unreasonably high burden for the prosecution
to have to prove the intent to destroy a protected group with respect to each individual
killing in order to distinguish genocide from murder. See S.C. 1994 Expert Report, supra
note 85, c 167.
149. Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt. 7. The United States legislation uses the
phrase "viable entity" to convey the same concept. See Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1093(8).
150. See Abrams, supra note 32, 304.
151. See Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, Cf 81.
152. Id.
153. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND P. MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL IOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 530 (1996).
154. See Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt. 8.
155. ROBINSON, supra note 18, 63.
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It is not necessary for a genocidist to intend to destroy a protected
group in its entirety. The Convention provides that it is sufficient to intend
to destroy a protected group "in part."1 56 But when something less than
absolute destruction is contemplated, uncertainty arises in terms of the
meaning of the phrase "in part." Does it refer to any part of the group
(including individual members), to a majority of the group, to a certain
percentage of the group in a given geographical area, etc.?
A variety of sources opine that the phrase "in part" in Article It really
means "in substantial part." The reading-in of the word "substantial"
appears to arise out of the search for a practical way to distinguish geno-
cide (viewed generally as a large-scale crime against a protected group)
from ordinary "hate" or "bias" crimes (viewed generally as an attack on an
individual because of his membership in the group, or aggravated
thereby). ' 5 7 The apparent effort is to parce out matters of domestic versus
international concern and to prevent dilution of the crime by reserving the
label "genocide" for large-scale activities against human collectives. The
ICC Statute attempts to achieve this aim by imposing a contextual require-
ment, which mandates that the genocidal attack either take place as part of
an objective pattern of similar conduct against the group or be sufficient to
effect such group destruction in and of itself. 158
The United States' domestic genocide legislation specifically requires
the intent to destroy a substantial part of a group.159 It defines "substantial
part" as "a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruc-
tion or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a
viable entity within the nation of which the group is a part."'160 Other
sources adopt a "substantial part" test without the concomitant definition
restricting genocide to acts rendering a group all but numerically extinct,
leaving the phrase open to broader understanding.' 6' It is clear, however,
that the modern trend in the quantitative analysis is toward a requirement
that the perpetrator intend to destroy "a quantitatively substantial part of
the protected group.' 1 62
156. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 11. See also Draft Code, supra note
22, art. 17 cmt. 8 ("It is not necessary to achieve the complete annihilation of a group
from every corner of the globe.").
157. See generally FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE (1999).
158. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Add. 2, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, 6-8, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/
INF/3/Add.2 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/elements/english/
add2e.doc.
159. See Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1091(a). Even the Department of State recognizes
that the US position on the phrase "in part" is not necessarily the only realistic interpre-
tation. See Murphy, supra note 82, 260 ("The U.S. position probably represents a maxi-
mum requirement; the position has also been taken that the murder of a single member
of a protected group, carried out with the idea that the group should be eliminated,
constitutes genocide."). See also SUNGA, supra note 58, 114 (arguing against such a
restrictive interpretation).
160. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1093(8).
161. See, e.g., Bagilishema, supra note 10, 3 64; Draft Code, supra note 22, art. 17 cmt.
8.
162. Krstic, supra note 33, 1 586.
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In contrast to the "substantial part" test, some authorities hold that the
Convention requires the intent to destroy a substantial number of members
of the protected target group:
Therefore, the intent to destroy a multitude of persons of the same group
because of their belonging to this group, must be classified as Genocide even
if those persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or
within a region or within a single community, provided the number is sub-
stantial; the Convention is intended to deal with action against large num-
bers, not individuals even if they happen to possess the same group
characteristics. 163
The ICTR interpreted the "in part" language as mandating "the inten-
tion to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of that
group."' 64 In the ICTY, the court looks for "evidence of an intention to
destroy a reasonably substantial number relative to the total population of
the group." 165
During the drafting process, one participating state offered a third
interpretation and opined that the "in part" language still required the
intent to destroy an entire group but allowed that intent to be implemented
in stages. 166 This view contributed to much of the controversy over the
ratification of the Convention in the United States. 16 7 But despite its politi-
cal impact on the American Congress, the viability of the position is doubt-
ful: it contradicts the plain text of the Convention and has been disregarded
as a legitimate interpretation.1 68
The two primary formulations of the quantitative approach might be
called the "percentage test" and the "numeric test." The concepts are simi-
lar but not coextensive. The percentage test compares the number of vic-
tims to the size of the overall group. In the numeric test, the inquiry is
whether the number of victims, in and of itself, is sufficiently large.
The numeric test is better-suited to protecting large numbers of people
from genocide, while the percentage test works better for smaller popula-
tions. Thus, the intent to kill 10,000 Chinese in China probably qualifies
as the intent to destroy a substantial number of victims under the numeric
test even if the figure is statistically insignificant compared to a national
population exceeding one billion. On the other hand, the intent to kill
three members of a tiny aboriginal tribe of a dozen people (25%) probably
is sufficient under the percentage test, whereas the number hardly seems
to constitutes a "multitude" or "considerable number" of victims. In Jelisic,
the ICTY Trial Chamber apparently equated the tests in determining
whether the accused intended to destroy a "substantial part" of the target
163. ROBINSON, supra note 18, 63.
164. See Kayishema, supra note 68, '1 97.
165. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-1, '1 65 (ICTY Trial Chamber Sept. 3,
2001), available at www.un.org/icty.
166. 3 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 73rd mtg., at 94-95, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.73
(1948) (Mr. Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
167. See LAWRENCEJ. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 39-
40 (1991).
168. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 18, 63.
Cornell International Law Journal
group. t 69
In practice, the two tests often will amount to a distinction without a
difference. Under the numeric inquiry, the court still must determine
whether the extent of victimization was "substantial."' 70 It is unlikely that
a court can make this determination abstractly: there must be at least some
reference to the overall group population.
Whether or not the tests are distinct, the result in many cases of geno-
cide will be identical: the number of victims will constitute both a signifi-
cant number of victims and a significant percentage of the targeted group.
This certainly was the case in Rwanda, where between 800,000 and 1 mil-
lion people in a population of approximately 7 million were killed in 1994
alone.' 71
One UN Special Rapporteur opined that both proportionate scale and
the total number victimized should be considered,17 2 and there appears to
be some judicial receptivity to using both tests. In Kayishema, the court
held that "both proportionate scale and total number are relevant." 173 The
Kayishema court held, however, that destroying a group "in part" required
an intent to "destroy a considerable number of individuals," 174 implying
greater reliance on the numerical test. Likewise, the United States Depart-
ment of State apparently considered both criteria in formulating its mid-
1994 conclusion about the existence of genocide in Rwanda: "The number
of Tutsis subjected to killings and other listed acts involved in Rwanda can
easily be considered substantial. International humanitarian agencies esti-
mate that from eight to forty percent of the Tutsi population may have
perished." 175
Both formulations are linked to geographical considerations. Once
the protected group is defined, each test looks to the composition and size
of that group within a particular geographical area. 17 6 This reliance on
geography is somewhat problematic because the result can change depend-
ing on the scope of the area considered. Since the geographic line can be
drawn in different places, the identical set of facts can lead some authori-
ties to conclude that genocidal intent existed while others find that it did
not. For example, a dozen Muslims may constitute neither a "substantial
part" nor a "substantial number" of Muslims in the world, in a particular
nation, in a region, or even in many cities. It may well be a "substantial
part" or "substantial number" of Muslims living in a small village, on a
street, or within a particular building. Whether genocidal intent exists
thus is to some extent a function of how broadly the group in question is
regarded.
169. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, n.111.
170. Id.
171. Kayishema, supra note 68, 4 291.
172. Whitaker, supra note 108, 1 29.
173. Id. at '1 96.
174. Id.
175. See Murphy, supra note 82, 260.
176. See Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1091(a); ROBINSON, supra note 18, 63.
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Some commentators advocate a wide focus on genocidal intent and
argue that the actor's intent must be to destroy the group in its entirety
within the nation. "The history of the negotiations is quite clear. The overt
acts constituting genocide become genocide only when committed as part
of a plan to destroy a group in its entirety within the state. Obviously, the
commission of genocide affects a substantial number of persons ....,177
The United States likewise draws the line on the basis of nationality, but
tempers it somewhat by contemplating less than absolute destruction,
focusing on the group's ongoing viability within a State.' 78
Conversely, recent case law from the international criminal tribunals
reflects a more tailored approach. In Jelisic, the Court held that genocide
could be "perpetrated in a limited geographic zone." 179 The opinion noted
that a limited geographical zone could be as small as a municipality, I8 0 as
does more recent case law from the ICTY.' 8 1
The mere fact that genocidal acts are concentrated in a limited geo-
graphical zone, however, is not dispositive to the question of whether geno-
cide has taken place. What matters is the relation of that cluster of attacks
to the wider geographical definition of the group. Even the intent to elimi-
nate 100% of the group's population in a particular area may not be suffi-
cient vis a vis a broad conception of the protected group as a whole (as with
the United States formulation that looks to remaining viability within a
nation).
In Kayisherma, the ICTR found Kayishema guilty of genocide, inter
alia, for acts that took place in limited geographical areas: the killing of at
least 8,000 Tutsi at the Gatwaro Stadium in Kibuye Town and another
4,000-5,500 at a Church in Mubuga (both historically safe havens in times
of racial strife in Rwanda). '8 2 Kayishema was the prefect (governor) of the
Kibuye prefecture (one of eleven regional areas in Rwanda), which was in
turn divided into nine communities.' a 3 Both massacre sites fell within
Kayishema's prefecture.
Kayishema's actions in Kibuye took place against the wider backdrop
of nationwide atrocities against Tutsi. 18 4 The Kayishema opinion did not
specify whether Kayishema acted with the intent to substantially destroy
Tutsis within those communities, within his prefecture, or within the nation
itself. If the Jelisic formulation is credited, the distinction probably does
not matter. Kayishema could commit genocide if he intended to destroy a
substantial part of the population of Tutsi in the individual communities of
Mubuga or Kibuye Town or within the wider prefect of Kibuye, whether or
177. Philip B. Perlman, The Genocide Convention, 30 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1950).
178. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1093(8).
179. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, 1 83.
180. Id.
181. Sikirica, supra note 165, ' 68.
182. Kayishema, supra note 68, '19 531, 535, 556-563.
183. Id. at Ti 2, 20.
184. Id. at 11 54.
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not his actions were part of a larger genocidal plan to destroy the Tutsi
population in Rwanda as a whole.
The result would be different if the wider conception of geographic
scope was mandated. The national model, for example, frames genocide as
an act intended to destroy a substantial part of the protected group within a
nation. 185 If Kayishema intended only to rid his prefect of Tutsi, he proba-
bly could not be convicted of genocide. Despite their atrocity, the killings
at the Stadium (8,000 people) and at Mubuga Church (some 5,500 people)
probably would not constitute acts against a "substantial part" of the over-
all Tutsi population in Rwanda, where minimum estimates of the number
killed exceed 800,000.
In Sikirica, the ICTY considered genocidal liability for the victimiza-
tion of 1,000-1,400 Muslims in its acquittal of the accused on charges of
genocide. The court held that "Itihis would represent between 2% and
2.8% of the Muslims in the Prijedor municipality and would hardly qualify
as a 'reasonably substantial' part of the Bosnian Muslim group in
Prijedor."'18 6 Although the tribunal was quick to note that "Itihe fact that
the evidence does not establish that a substantial number of Bosnian Mus-
lims or Bosnian Croats were victims . . . does not necessarily negate the
inference that there was an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim or
Bosnian Croat group," the ICTY nevertheless determined that when the
quantitative figures were "considered along with other aspects of the evi-
dence, it becomes clear that this is not a case in which the intent to destroy
a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats can properly
be inferred." 18 7
It seems clear that the quantitative method should have some ongoing
application in determining genocidal intent, although it is not the sole
proper inquiry in that regard. At present, the trend appears to be (prop-
erly) away from the United States's national model embodied in the
Proxmire Act.' 88 The better approach is to credit the notion that genocide
can be committed (as judged on a case-by-case basis) in an area as small as
a municipality or a community, depending upon the perpetrators' ultimate
intent for the group.
The percentage test and the numerical formulation both add value to
the inquiry of whether genocidal intent existed in a particular case, and
both theories should be recognized and applied in future genocide cases.
Each is consonant with the overall object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention to protect human groups from physical or biological destruc-
tion. The percentage test is better-suited to protecting smaller collectives
185. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1093(8).
186. Sikirica, supra note 165, '1 72.
187. Id. at 75.
188. CompareJelisic (TC), supra note 3, Cf 83 ("international custom admits the charac-
terization of genocide even when the exterminatory intent only extends to a limited
geographic zone") and Sikirica, supra note 165, Cf 68 (the inquiry can focus upon acts
within "a country or a region or a single community") with Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1093(8) (focusing inquiry on a nationwide basis).
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who are targeted for genocidal acts, whereas the numerical test better cov-
ers situations where a large number of people are victimized. Although the
result under both analyses in many instances will be the same, it is both
sensible and proper to infer genocidal intent if either test is satisfied in any
particular case.
2. The Qualitative Approach
The qualitative analysis takes an opposite approach from the quantitative
method. Its fundamental premise is that members of the group have une-
qual worth for purposes of the survival of the group. As Professor Bas-
siouni put it, the concept of genocide "is sufficiently pliable to encompass
not only the targeting of an entire group, as stated in the Convention, but
also the targeting of certain segments of a given group, such as the Muslim
elite or the Muslim women."'18 9 The targeting of some group members is
believed to be more harmful because their loss contributes more signifi-
cantly to the destruction of the group. In the words of the UN Commission
of Experts, a focused attack on a specific segment of a protected group (i.e.,
political, business, or intellectual leaders or military or law enforcement
personnel) "may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the num-
bers killed."t 9o
To use a simple example, assume that a nomadic aboriginal tribe is
targeted for genocide. Five percent of the tribe are "hunters," whose work
produces almost all of the food consumed by the tribe. Under the qualita-
tive approach, the killing of the hunters with the intent to destroy the tribe
may constitute genocide even if killing 5% of the tribe would be insuffi-
cient under a quantitative approach. The killing of the hunters is consid-
ered genocide because, without the food they provide, the chances are
much greater that the tribe as a whole will be destroyed.
The Jelisic court adopted a subjective approach and held that the
targeting of the group's leadership must be considered in light of the fate of
the rest of the group. If the group's leadership was exterminated and the
rest of the group was subsequently or concurrently further victimized,
deported or forced to flee, the actions against the leaders may constitute
genocide. 19'
The concept of qualitative genocide is not recognized universally' 9 2
and presents some complications in application. An initial question arises
as to the scope of qualitative destruction contemplated. Dictum adopted by
the Jelisic Court appears to move beyond the physical and biological sur-
vival of the group and into the area of the group's economic, social and
189. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Counsil Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian law in the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRiM. L. F. 279, 323-24 (1994).
190. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Counsil Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. A/1994/674 at 1 94 (1994). See also Krstic,
supra note 33, c1 587; Sirkirica, supra note 165, 91 65.
191. Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, ' 81.
192. See, e.g., Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1093(8) (only numerical loss leads to the
destruction of the group as a "viable entity").
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cultural preservation. 19 3 These additional concepts were not included in
the Genocide Convention, and it would be a vast (and unwarranted) expan-
sion of the treaty's mandate to read them back in via the qualitative
approach.
If the qualitative approach is used at all, it must be applied in accord
with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and limited to the
physical and biological existence of the group. Attacks on academics, intel-
lectuals, economic leaders, and religious leaders in and of themselves are
insufficient to prove genocidal intent per se. There must be some addi-
tional proof that the victimization of the particular segment was in fact an
attack upon the physical or biological viability of the group itself. This
apparently was the aim of the ICTY trial chamber in Krstic, which analyzed
the effect on the group of an attack on all military-aged men on the group
of Bosnian Muslims in Srebenica. 194
But even in the physical and biological context, the qualitative
approach, as applied to date, suffers from a problematic fundamental pre-
mise. It presumes that some human beings are (or were) inherently more
valuable than others and that a court can somehow make this determina-
tion. This assumption is somewhat elitist' 9 5 and not even necessarily
valid.
The concept of objectively-measurable worth may have some applica-
tion in certain clearly defined cases (as in the example of the aboriginal
hunters, above). As a rule of general application, however, it is fraught with
practical complications. Group members can hardly be expected to be a
source of accurate testimony on the worth of their fellow group members
vis a vis the survival of the group. And apart from distinguishing group
members along functional lines and making presumptions about the actual
effect of those functions on the group, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
for a court to develop sound criteria to judge the relative value of human
beings.
The qualitative test as applied in the Jelisic decision also to some extent
is inconsistent with the Genocide Convention itself, in that it seeks to infer
genocidal intent based upon the results of a qualitative attack on the
group. 196 But results are irrelevant for purposes of genocide: the Conven-
tion articulates an inchoate crime, which penalizes the doing of certain acts
with the requisite intent, not the successful results of those acts. It is irrele-
vant to the question of mens rea under the Convention whether a qualita-
tive attack had any effect upon the group at all.
The analysis in Krstic comes closer to the mark in its focus upon what
the Bosnian Serb forces knew or must have known would result from their
193. See Jelisic (TC), supra note 3, 11 81.
194. Krstic, supra note 33, c 595.
195. See Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary
Strategies for Combating a Crime Against Humanity, 92 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 1, 11
(1998).
196. SecJelisic (TC), supra note 3, If 81.
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killing of 7,500-plus military-aged Muslim men at Srebenica. 19 7 The
ICTY's focus in that case was properly directed to the perpetrator's intent.
But even Krstic can be criticized somewhat for its lack of precision. As a
matter of the law of evidence to prove that genocidal intent existed, Kristic
is sound: it certainly makes sense to look at what actually happened in
Srebenica to infer what the Bosnian Serbs intended for the region. This
being said, the Krstic decision should not be interpreted as imposing a
requirement that a targeted qualitative attack have any actual effect on the
group or that the targeted segment of the group was in fact valuable for the
purposes of the group's physical or biological survival.
A more precise approach would be to adopt a qualitative analysis that
focuses upon the perpetrator's subjective beliefs as to the valuable seg-
ments of a target group for purposes of the group's physical and biological
existence. The court could then focus upon tangible evidence of the sub-
jective intent of the perpetrator. Framing the question in terms of what the
perpetrator believed eliminates the elitist tinge of having a court objectively
judge the relative worth of human beings and removes any results-focused
bias from the analysis.
The subjective version of the qualitative test would be satisfied if, with
the intent to destroy all or part of the group as such, the perpetrator victim-
ized specific group members with the belief that those victims had some
enhanced qualitative value to the physical or biological survival of the
group (i.e., that they were "hunters," medical doctors, soldiers, etc.). The
focus rests upon the perpetrator's understanding of the valuable segments
of the group. There is no need, however, to establish that the perpetrator's
beliefs about the group (or its valuable segments) were in fact correct or
that the qualitative targeting had any actual effect upon the group.
The formulation advocated here aligns best with the inchoate struc-
ture of the Convention, which penalizes acts that are committed with a
certain mental state, rather than the successful results of that conduct. As
noted previously, for purposes of genocide, the perpetrator's views are the
ones that truly matter, not the subjective views of the victims or even an
objective determination of value by a court. It matters not whether the
perpetrator is objectively correct about the value of the victim(s) to the
group. If the perpetrator chose a victim in the belief that the victim had
enhanced value, what matters is the fact that a criminal choice was made,
not that the choice was based upon good information or proved to be accu-
rate in hindsight. If a perpetrator attacks a certain segment of a protected
group with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, that criminal
attack can and should be punished as an act of genocide under the
Convention.
197. See Krstic, supra note 33, '11 595-98.
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Conclusion
Genocide has plagued humanity for millennia, but it was only in the mid-
twentieth century that the crime was so-labeled. The core concept of the
crime is the protection of human groups as groups (distinguishing geno-
cide from so-called "hate" or "bias" crimes against individuals).
Genocide evolved rapidly from an academic concept to a firm princi-
ple of international law. Raphael Lemkin's conception of genocide as a
multi-faceted attack on the various aspects (i.e., physical, political, social,
biological, cultural, etc.) of existence of human groups yielded to a drafting
process that enabled genocide to stand as a distinct crime embodied in a
multilateral treaty, the Genocide Convention. Shortly thereafter, genocide
was recognized as a jus cogens norm of customary international law whose
prohibitions extended to the world entire, superseding the effects of mere
treaty obligation. 198 Widespread ratification nevertheless followed, and
the Convention today is one of the most widely accepted and ratified inter-
national instruments.
Despite its widespread acceptance, the Convention has been much-
criticized for its shortcomings, particularly with respect to the human
groups included within its protections. But even within the four categories
of protected national, religious, ethnic and racial groups covered by the
treaty, there has been much difficulty to date in adequately defining the
precise contours of each of the protected groups under the Convention.
Each act of genocide must stand or fall on its own and the determina-
tion of whether a protected group exists must be made on a case-by-case
basis. Nevertheless, the criteria applied in determining whether a pro-
tected group exists (and how that group is targeted) will largely determine
whether a charge of genocide will succeed or fail.
Judicial efforts to achieve an objective or scientific definition of pro-
tected groups under the Convention have proved largely artificial and often
bear no relation to the group as-targeted by the perpetrators of the crime.
As such, the better approach to defining groups under the Convention is to
adopt a subjective inquiry into the contours of the group as defined by the
perpetrators themselves. This subjective approach is necessary because the
concept of a human group, protected or otherwise, is necessarily abstract
and devoid of any genuine scientific or other purely-objective parameters.
But because a purely subjective approach could lead to group definitions
that are inconsistent with the manifest object and purpose of the Conven-
tion, this article advocates a hybrid approach that accounts for the subjec-
tive views of the perpetrator but requires a baseline measure of external
indicia linking the perpetrator's understanding to the group's pre-genocide
existence in society.
198. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Adv. Op.), 1951 L.CJ. 15, 23 (1951) (discussing genocide as a jus cogens
norm); Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3, 32 (5 Feb.) (Second Phase)
(discussing genocide as an obligation erga omnes).
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Once the contours of the group are defined, it again lies with the court
to ascertain whether, in light of prohibited acts against group members,
genocidal intent actually was manifested against the group itself. Although
a numerical analysis in this regard is helpful and offers some valid insight
into genocidal intent, quantitative approaches provide only half the answer.
The object and purpose of the Convention call for a broad conception of
what it means to destroy a group "as such." Accordingly, this article advo-
cates the alternate recognition of a more flexible qualitative approach
grounded principally in the intentions of the genocidist for the perceived
"valuable" segments of the group. If a perpetrator attacks a certain seg-
ment of a protected group with the intent to destroy the group in whole or
in part, that criminal attack can and should be punished as an act of geno-
cide under the Convention.
It is proper to adopt a liberal understanding of the groups protected
under the Convention and the methods by which genocidal intent against
those groups may be manifested. In the final analysis, however, these
efforts must be understood and applied within the textual parameters set
forth by the Convention's drafters. It is only through a broad reading of the
text, rigorously applied and analyzed under established principles of inter-
national jurisprudence, that the true "humanitarian and civilizing pur-
pose" 19 9 behind the Convention actually can be recognized and effected on
an international scale.
199. See Reservations, supra note 198, 1951 I.C.J. at 23.

